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Abstract
We investigate the relationship between symmetry reduction and inductive rea-
soning when applied to model checking networks of featured components. Popular
reduction techniques for combatting state space explosion in model checking, like ab-
straction and symmetry reduction, can only be applied eectively when the natural
symmetry of a system is not destroyed during specication. We introduce a prop-
erty which ensures this is preserved, open symmetry. We describe a template-based
approach for the construction of open symmetric Promela specications of featured
systems. For certain systems (safely featured parameterised systems) our generated
specications are suitable for conversion to abstract specications representing any
size of network. This enables feature interaction analysis to be carried out, via model
checking and induction, for systems of any number of featured components. In ad-
dition, we show how, for any balanced network of components, by using a graphical
representation of the features and the process communication structure, a group
of permutations of the underlying state space of the generated specication can be
determined easily. Due to the open symmetry of our Promela specications, this
group of permutations can be used directly for symmetry reduced model checking.
The main contributions of this paper are an automatic method for developing
open symmetric specications which can be used for generic feature interaction
analysis, and the novel application of symmetry detection and reduction in the
context of model checking featured networks.
We apply our techniques to a well known example of a featured network - an
email system.
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1 Introduction
Model checking [14,36,38] is a popular automated approach for investigating
the behaviour of computer networks. A system is specied using a modelling
language, and a state space (or model) generated. The state space is explored
to check properties that are expected to hold for the original system. In partic-
ular, model checking is a useful technique for carrying out feature interaction
analysis on networks of featured components. However, model checking suers
from the well known state space explosion problem: the size of the state space
grows exponentially with the number of components.
Approaches for combatting state space explosion often involve abstraction to
replace sets of states with state representatives. One method, induction, is
used to construct an (abstract) state space which encapsulates the behaviour
of systems of any size. This method is useful for ensuring that properties which
hold for small, nite systems, still hold when any number of new components
are added to the system. However, if a property does not hold for the abstract
state space, no general result can be inferred (and no meaningful counter-
example generated).
For large, nite systems, symmetry reduction is an alternative reduction tech-
nique which can be used to reduce the size of the state space { sometimes
dramatically. Symmetry reduction involves nding a group of permutations
of the state space which preserve the property to be checked, and using it to
build a (smaller) quotient state space. The property will hold for the quotient
state space if and only if it holds for the original state space.
In previous work [9,37] we have used an abstraction/induction approach to
model and analyse parameterised networks of featured components, for net-
works of any size. Our approach relies upon restricting the behaviour of the
components to be open symmetric. Open symmetry requires that for any state-
ment in the specication that refers to a literal component id, all symmetrically
equivalent statements are present in the component specication.
We have also developed an approach, for balanced networks of unfeatured
components, to detect the symmetry present in a system using a graphical
representation of the process communication structure { the static channel
diagram (SCD) [17,19]. The SCD is generated automatically from a Promela
specication of the system, and a suitable automorphism group of the state
space (G  Aut(M)) is obtained from the automorphism group of the SCD
(Aut(SCD)). Although Aut(SCD) can be found easily and automatically,
some elements of Aut(SCD) are not valid: they do not belong to Aut(M).
Thus it is necessary to remove all invalid elements of Aut(SCD) to obtain
a suitable automorphism group G. This involves checking the validity of the
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group generators against the Promela specication itself. If the model could be
ensured to be open symmetric however, all elements of Aut(SCD) would be
valid with respect to the model, and we would only need to check the validity
of the generators against the property to be veried. This would be faster and
in many cases would mean that we could use G = Aut(SCD) directly for
symmetry reduced model checking.
While conducting our previous work on abstraction/induction and symmetry
detection we have been struck by strong parallels between the approaches used.
For example, in both cases the techniques are less eective (or do not apply
at all) if components are not open symmetric. We have become increasingly
aware that the tools we have developed for constructing models suitable for
abstraction/induction, could be used to construct nite models of networks of
featured components to which symmetry reduction can be applied.
In this paper we show how, for any balanced network of featured components we
can use a template-based approach to generate Promela specications which
are, by construction, open symmetric. For safely featured parameterised sys-
tems the generated specications are suitable for applying our induction ap-
proach.
In addition, we introduce a new graphical representation of the specication {
a feature conguration diagram (FCD) and show that the automorphism group
of the FCD induces an automorphism group of the underlying state space, for
any balanced system. This allows for immediate application of symmetry re-
duction methods, without the need to check for symmetry validity. We present
a tool { the featured specication generator (FSG) to implement our approach,
and we present experimental results for an email system. This extension of our
earlier work is the rst time we have applied symmetry detection methods to
networks of featured components.
Our methods are illustrated via two example networks: a telephone network,
in which all components are of the same type, and an email network in which
there are two types of component - client components and a mailer component.
However, it is important to point out that our techniques are applicable to
networks consisting of multiple component types.
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2 Background
2.1 Systems and Specications
Consider a system of communicating components. A specication of the sys-
tem consists of a set of processes (each describing a component) together with
a set of channels. Processes can be separated into dierent types according to
the type of component they represent (e.g. client component or server com-
ponent).
Denition 1 A specication with k process types, for some k > 0, consists
of the parallel execution of processes thus:
p
1;1
jj : : : jjp
1;n
1
jjp
2;1
jj : : : jjp
2;n
2
jj : : : jjp
k;1
jj : : : jjp
k;n
k
where, for 1  i  k, n
i
is the number of components of type i.
Channels are also classied by type according to their length, and the type of
messages they can contain.
Denition 2 We say that a system is balanced if:
(1) Every component has a single dedicated channel for incoming messages.
(2) If components i and j have the same type and have dedicated channels i
0
and j
0
respectively, then i
0
and j
0
have the same type.
(3) If component i has type t
i
and can send messages to component j, which
has type t
j
, then component i can send messages to all components of
type t
j
.
The specication of a balanced system is called a balanced specication.
An example of a balanced system is a simple peer-to-peer system consisting
of n components each of which send and receive the same type of messages,
and can communicate with every other component. Similarly a system con-
sisting of n 1 client components (say) together with a hub component which
is responsible for relaying messages between the components is also balanced.
However, consider a tiered system consisting of a number of client components
together with a number of server components, in which client components
send messages to a specied server component (but not to other server com-
ponents). This system is not balanced: to be balanced, each client component
should be able to send messages to either all or none of the server components.
Features can be used to add this type of selective behaviour to an otherwise
balanced system.
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2.2 Features
System components with the same type may have dierent functionality. The
mechanism for structuring functionality additional to a basic behaviour is
commonly called a feature. The concept originated in telephony where features
such as call forwarding, ring back when free, etc. are added to a basic call
behaviour. Features fundamentally aect basic behaviour in dierent ways,
and so components with features are not, in general, isomorphic. Moreover,
the features associated with one component can aect the behaviour of other
(possibly featured) components.
A component is said to subscribe to a feature f (belonging to a given set
of features), and a network is featured when (at least one of) the associated
components subscribes to at least one feature. The component that subscribes
to a feature is known as the feature host. We assume that, when features are
implemented within a specication of a system, they are implemented via an
array.
An instantiation of a feature f is an application of f to a given component or
set of components. A conguration of feature f is a a set of instantiations of
f for a given system. For example, in a telephone system, setting component
2 to unconditionally forward messages to component 3 is an instantiation of
the call forward unconditional (CFU) feature.
A unary feature is a feature which is instantiated with respect to a single
component and a binary feature is a feature which is instantiated with respect
to two components. For example, originating calls only (OCO) is a unary fea-
ture and terminating call screening (TCS) is a binary feature. We assume that
unary features are instantiated using a statement of the form F [i] = 1 with
the default instantiation F [i] = 0. Similarly binary features are instantiated
using a statement of the form F [i][j] = 1, where i is the feature host. In this
case the default instantiation is F [i][j] = 0.
A binary feature f induces a relation R(f) on the set f1; 2; : : : ; ng of compo-
nent identiers:
(i; j) 2 R(f) if f [i][j] = 1:
We use 
R(f)
to denote the characteristic function of R(f), which maps (i; j)
to 1 if (i; j) 2 R(f), and maps (i; j) to 0 otherwise (1  i; j  n).
2.2.1 Feature Interaction
Property-based feature interaction analysis involves checking that temporal
properties which characterise a given feature are preserved (or not) in the
presence of another feature(s). The usual notation for this is the following,
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assuming S is a system updated with features f
1
and f
2
: does S + f
1
j= 
imply S + f
1
+ f
2
j= ?
Assuming c is a component with no features, c
f
1
and c
f
1
are components with
features f
1
and f
2
resp., and jj is parallel composition, then an example of
interaction analysis in this context is:
i) does (c
f
1
jjc) j=  imply (c
f
1
jjc
f
2
) j= ?
Of course a component can subscribe to more than one feature. For example,
assuming that c
f
1;f2
is a component with features f
1
and f
2
, then another
example of feature interaction analysis is:
ii) does (c
f
1
) j=  imply (c
f
1;f2
) j= ?
2.3 Model Checking
Model checking involves checking Kripke structures [14] to verify given tem-
poral properties.
Denition 3 Let AP be a set of atomic propositions. A Kripke structure over
AP is a tuple M = (S; S
0
; R; L) where S is a nite set of states, S
0
 S is
the set of initial states, R  S  S is a transition relation and L : S ! 2
AP
is a function that labels each state with the set of atomic propositions true in
that state.
From here on we will assume that all models have a single initial state s
0
.
The logic LTL is dened as a set of formulas of the form A where the
quantier A is used to denote for all paths and  is a path formula in which the
only state subformulas are atomic propositions. The set of LTL path formulas
are dened inductively below where X, U , hi and [] represent the standard
nexttime, strong until, eventually and always operators (where hi = trueU
and [] = :hi: respectively). Let AP be a nite set of propositions. Then
 for all p 2 AP , p is a path formula
 if  and  are path formulas, then so are :,  ^  ,  _  , X, U , hi
and [].
When referring to an LTL formula, one generally omits the A operator and
instead interprets the formula  as \for all paths ". For a model M, if the
formula  holds for all paths in M we write M j= .
Denition 4 Let M and M
0
be Kripke structures with associated sets of
atomic propositions AP and AP
0
respectively, where AP  AP
0
. A relation
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H  S  S
0
is a simulation relation between M and M
0
if and only if for all
s and s
0
, if H(s; s
0
) then
(1) L(s) \ AP
0
= L
0
(s
0
)
(2) For every state s
1
such that R(s; s
1
), there is a state s
0
1
with the property
that R
0
(s
0
; s
0
1
) and H(s
1
; s
0
1
).
If H(s
0
; s
0
0
), we say that M
0
simulates M and write MM
0
.
The following is derived from a well known result [14].
Lemma 1 Suppose that M  M
0
. Then for every LTL formula  with
atomic propositions in AP
0
, if M
0
j=  then M j= .
2.3.1 Promela and SPIN
Promela is an imperative specication language with constructs for concur-
rency, nondeterminism, asynchronous and synchronous communication, dy-
namic process creation, parameterised processes, and mobile connections, i.e.
communication channels can be passed along other communication channels.
SPIN is the bespoke model checker for Promela and provides several reasoning
mechanisms: deadlock and assertion checking, acceptance and progress states
and cycle detection, and satisfaction of LTL properties.
In order to perform verication on a Promela specication, SPIN translates
a process template for each process type into a nite automaton and then
computes an asynchronous interleaving product of these automata to obtain
the global behaviour of concurrent specication. This interleaving product is
referred to as the state space. We can infer properties of a concurrent system by
checking properties of the state space associated with a Promela specication
of the system. Given a Promela specication with n processes, the associated
model or Kripke structure (which we identify with the state space), is denoted
by M
n
.
2.3.2 The Parameterised Model Checking Problem (PMCP)
We consider specications (see Denition 1) in which either all processes have
the same type, or there is a distinguished context process, and all other pro-
cesses have the same type. That is, our specications have the form
p
1
jjp
2
jj : : : jjp
N
where the p
i
, for 2  i  N have the same type and p
1
may or may not have the
same type as p
i
for 2  i  N . For each specication we can generate a family
7
of specications by successively increasing N . As such, each specication
p
1
jjp
2
jj : : : jjp
N
is called a parameterised specication and the associated system is called a
parameterised system.
For a xed N , provided N is small enough, we can check a property  holds
for a parameterised specication by building a model M
N
(using SPIN) and
checking that M
N
j= . However, what can we infer about such a system in
general?
Note that parameterised systems are not limited to having one or two types
of component. Indeed, the parameterised model checking problem can be ex-
tended to systems with multiple component types where the number of com-
ponents of one of the types is unlimited. We consider only the simpler cases
here for ease of argument.
Denition 5 For a parameterised specication as described above, the param-
eterised model checking problem (PMCP) is thus: for an LTL property , can
we show that M
N
j=  for any N?
It is not possible to solve PMCP using model checking alone [2]. However, one
approach that has proved successful for verifying some parameterised systems
involves the construction of a network invariant [4,13,34]. The network invari-
ant I represents an arbitrary member of the family F = fM
n
: n  n
0
g and
proof of a given property  for I can be shown to imply that any member of
the family F satises .
Some other techniques that have been used to verify parameterised systems
include those based on theorem proving [15], on abstraction [28], or on a
combination of the two [31]. A further method is to use explicit inductive
techniques combined with model checking [20,24,35,42].
In Section 4 we describe an invariant-based approach which combines ab-
straction and induction to verify parameterised systems in which individual
components may be distinguished by way of features. Our invariant process is
constructed by modifying a Promela specication for a network of xed size,
and using SPIN to construct the corresponding Kripke structure. Our approach
is an example of how an invariant processes can be constructed in practice, to
extend results proved for small, xed sized models, to results which hold for
models of any size. One of the major assumptions we make is that our models
satisfy a property known as open symmetry.
Like all network invariant approaches, this approach is limited to systems with
a regular topology, which grow in a regular way as the number of components
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increases.
2.4 Open Symmetry
In this section we summarise some denitions from group theory which we
will use to dene the conditions for our abstraction approach in Section 4 and
to describe symmetry reduction techniques in Section 5.
Denition 6 Let G be a non-empty set, and let Æ : G G ! G be a binary
operation. We say that (G; Æ) is a group if G is closed under Æ; Æ is associative;
G has an identity element 1
G
; and for each element  2 G there is an inverse
element 
 1
2 G such that  Æ 
 1
= 
 1
Æ  = 1
G
.
We call the operation Æ multiplication in G. When it is clear what the binary
operation is, we simply refer to a group as G rather than (G; Æ), and use
concatenation to denote multiplication.
For any G be a group, and let 
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
n
2 G. The smallest subgroup of
G containing the elements 
1
; : : : ; 
n
is denoted h
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
n
i, and is called
the subgroup generated by 
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
n
. The elements 
i
(1  i  n) are
called generators for this subgroup.
The set of all permutations of a set X forms a group under composition
of mappings Sym(X). For any Promela specication P say, we can apply a
permutation (of component ids)  to the statements of P by replacing every
occurrence i of a literal component id with (i).
Denition 7 Let P be a Promela specication and V the associated set of
component ids. We say that P is open symmetric if, for any process p of P ,
for any statement  of p, ( ) is a statement of p for all  2 Sym(V ).
An automorphism of a Kripke structureM = (S;R; L; s
0
) is an edge-preserving
permutation of S which xes s
0
.
3 Feature Interaction Analysis Using Model Checking
We assume that our systems are balanced (see Denition 2). As examples
of this type of system, we have modelled a featured telephone system con-
sisting of N instantiations of a user component and a featured email system
consisting of a mailer component and N client components. In the Promela
specications for these systems, each process is an instantiation of a param-
eterised proctype process, where the only parameter is the dedicated channel
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name for the process.
3.1 Promela Specications
The basic (unfeatured) Promela process proctypes are based on high-level
abstract automata (see [8] for full details) for the system components. In the
automata, transitions are made between call-states (like idle and calling in
the telephone example, and sendmail and delivermail in the email example).
These call states are represented in the specication using labels.
Features are included via global feature arrays and implemented via feature
statements of the form
atomic{(feature_prop)&&(localprop)&&(varprop)->command_guard}
where feature prop is a proposition which checks whether a feature is sub-
scribed to, and localprop is a proposition about local variables. The propo-
sition varprop, which may be empty, is a proposition about global variables.
These global variables may include elements of global feature ag arrays which
indicate whether a feature has been instigated during a previous call. For ex-
ample, the variable may indicate whether or not a ringback been requested.
Our specications of featured networks are safely featured, as dened below:
Denition 8 A specication of a balanced featured network is said to be safely
featured if the only global variables are channels or elements of global arrays
indexed by process ids. These global arrays are either feature arrays (which
are xed), or arrays for which element with index i is only set or checked by
component with pid i.
Note that the latter type of global arrays are generally only included in a
specication for verication purposes (otherwise a local variable would suÆce).
We are not able to include the return when free (RWF) feature in our telephone
specication because it requires the use of a feature ag array in which element
with index i is set by components other than that with pid i.
Feature congurations (see Section 2.2) are declared within the init process.
For full example code for both the email and telephone models see [9].
3.2 Feature Interaction Analysis
For every feature f , an LTL property, or set of LTL properties is constructed
describing the functionality of the feature. The features are hereafter assumed
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to be dened by the properties describing them. For example, in the telephone
example the call forwarding unconditionally feature (CFU) (from user i to user
j) property is: If user k dials i then a call attempt will be made from user k
to user j before user k's handset is replaced. When i = 0; j = 1 and k = 2
this is described in LTL as [](p ! (:((:r)Uq))), where p = ((dialled[2] ==
0) ^ (user[p2]@calling)), q = (dev[2] == on) is and r = ((partner[2] ==
one) ^ ((user[p2]@oalert) _ (user[p2]@busy))).
To validate a feature for a given set of parameters (i, j and k in this example)
a Promela specication is constructed for a small number of processes, in
which the feature is initiated (by setting the associated feature array). The
associated LTL property (or a set of properties in some cases) is then checked
using SPIN. To determine whether a pair of features interact, a specication
in which both features are initiated is checked separately against the LTL
properties for the two features.
Note that, for any feature (or pair of features) there are many cases to be
checked, depending on the values taken by the feature parameters. For exam-
ple, to validate CFU for a specication of 6 processes there are 216 possible
combinations of i; j and k. However, this can be reduced to a much smaller
number of cases (3 in this example) by exploiting the symmetry between the
processes [10].
Full feature interaction results for both the telephone and email examples are
given in [8].
4 Abstraction/Induction for Model Checking Featured Networks
As we saw in Section 3.2, we can use model checking for feature interaction
analysis of a xed number of components. However, suppose that, for the
telephone example, we have shown that features f
1
and f
2
do not interact
when considered within a specication of a system of 5 user components,
can we be sure that they do not interact within a specication of a system
containing additional, possibly featured components? That is, can we prove
generic properties of specications of our telephone system? Similarly, can we
prove generic properties for the email system?
When unfeatured, our two example systems are parameterised systems, as
described in Section 2.3.2. In order to prove generic properties of our systems
in the presence of features, we will have to extend the PMCP (see Denition
5) to featured parameterised systems. Using our approach we can:
(1) validate features for specications consisting of any number of processes
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(and for which only one process has any features, namely the feature
being validated), and
(2) identify all pairs of features (f
1
and f
2
say) that do not interact, regardless
of the numbers of components.
We outline our approach in Section 4.1 below. For a more detailed description
and proofs of results, see [9,37].
4.1 The Abstraction/Induction Approach
We consider parameterised systems (Denition 2.3.2) with associated param-
eterised specications of the form
p
1
jjp
2
jj : : : jjp
N
where p
1
may, or may not, be a distinguished context process, and may have as-
sociated features. Otherwise, all of the processes are instantiations of the same
parameterised process and may, in addition, have features. We refer to such
specications as featured parameterised specications, and the corresponding
systems as featured parameterised systems.
For any feature f , we say that f is indexed by I
f
= fi
1
; : : : i
r
g if the feature
relates to components i
1
: : : i
r
. For example, in the telephone example, if f is
\user[0] forwards calls to user[3]", then f is said to be indexed by 0 and 3.
Similarly we say that a property  is indexed by a the set I

where I

is the
set of component ids associated with . For a (possibly empty) set of features
F = ff
1
: : : f
s
g and property , we dene the complete index set I of fgUF ,
to be I
f
1
U : : : [ I
f
s
[ I

.
Suppose that for features f
1
and f
2
and property , the complete index set
(or complete index set together with 1 if there is a context process in the
specication) is 1 : : :m. For every N > m, and every set of features subscribed
to by components p
m+1
; : : : ; p
N
, we can generate a specication p
1
jjp
2
jj : : : jjp
N
.
This gives rise to an innite family,A = A
f
1
;f
2
;
, of specications. We call these
concrete specications.
For each f
1
, f
2
and  we generate a new, nite model, abs(m) which represents
any member of A, and show that, provided our specications (and features)
satisfy certain conditions, M(abs(m)) j=  implies that M
N
j=  for all
M
N
2 M(A), where M(A) is the set of models associated with F . Note that
abs(m) is an invariant process for the system (see Section 2.3.2).
In abs(m), all processes p
m+1
; : : : ; p
N
(which we call abstracted processes) are
represented by a single process Abstract(m), and all processes p
1
; : : : ; p
m
(con-
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Fig. 1. Abstraction technique
crete processes) are represented by modied concrete processes p
0
1
; : : : ; p
0
m
. The
abstraction is illustrated in gure 1, with the original specication on the left
hand side and the specication abs(m) appearing on the right hand side. Our
main theorem holds because there is a simulation relation (see Denition 4)
between the two specications.
Theorem 1 LetM
N
=M(p
1
jjp
2
jj : : : jjp
N
) be a model of any featured param-
eterised specication in which features F are present, and  a property. If the
total index set of F [ fg is f1; : : : ; m  1g then, provided the specication is
both open symmetric and safely featured, M
abs(m)
j=  implies that M
N
j= .
The full proof of Theorem 1, together with a details of how the modied
processes are derived from the original concrete processes, and a description
of Abstract(m) is given in [9,37].
5 Symmetry Reduced Model Checking
In a model of a concurrent system with many replicated processes, Kripke
structure automorphisms (see Section 5) usually involve the permutation of
process identiers of identical processes throughout all states of a model. The
set of all automorphisms of the Kripke structure M forms a group under
composition of mappings. This group is denoted Aut(M). A subgroup G of
Aut(M) induces an equivalence relation 
G
on the states of M thus: s 
G
t , s = (t) for some  2 G. The equivalence class under 
G
of a state
s 2 S, denoted [s], is called the orbit of s under the action of G. The orbits
can be used to construct a quotient Kripke structure M
G
as follows:
Denition 9 The quotient Kripke structure M
G
of M with respect to G is
a tuple M
G
= (S
G
; R
G
; L
G
; [s
0
]) where:
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 S
G
= f[s] : s 2 Sg (the set of orbits of S under the action of G),
 R
G
= f([s]; [t]) : (s; t) 2 Rg,
 L
G
([s]) = L(rep([s])) (where rep([s]) is a unique representative of [s]),
 [s
0
] 2 S
G
(the orbit of the initial state s
0
2 S).
In generalM
G
is a smaller structure thanM, butM
G
andM are equivalent in
the sense that they satisfy the same set of logic properties which are invariant
under the group G (that is, properties which are \symmetric" with respect to
G). For a proof of the following theorem see [14].
Theorem 2 Let M be a Kripke structure, G a subgroup of Aut(M) and 
an LTL formula. If  is invariant under the group G then
M; s j= ,M
G
; [s] j= 
Thus by choosing a suitable symmetry group G, model checking can be per-
formed overM
G
instead ofM, often resulting in considerable savings in mem-
ory and verication time [3,12].
If automorphisms of a Kripke structure can be identied in advance, then a
quotient structure can be incrementally constructed using an algorithm given
in [29]. This means that it may be possible to construct the quotient structure
even if the original structure is intractable.
In [19] we show that symmetries of the Kripke structure associated with a
Promela program can be detected by analysing a graph derived from the
associated Promela specication, namely the static channel diagram of the
specication. We summarise this approach below. In Section 7 we show that, if
Promela specications are generated using our template-based approach (see
Section 6), we can extend our symmetry detection techniques to eectively
handle featured networks of components.
5.1 Detecting Symmetry in Promela Specications of Unfeatured Networks
Given a Promela specication P, the static channel diagram [17,18] of P,
SCD is a graphical representation of the communication structure associated
with P. The nodes of the graph represent the processes and static channels
(channels which are declared globally within the specication, out of the scope
of any proctype denition). Nodes are coloured, according to component or
channel type. An edge exists between nodes associated with component i and
channel j if and only if component i can send messages on channel j. Static
channel diagrams extend the notion of channel diagrams introduced in [43].
Generators for a group of candidate automorphisms for the modelM derived
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from P are found by analysing SCD. These generators are checked individually
against the specication to see if they induce valid automorphisms of M and
the largest possible subgroup of valid candidate automorphisms computed.
Unlike previous approaches to specifying symmetry using scalarsets [3,29],
the static channel diagram method can detect arbitrary structural symmetries
arising from the communication structure of a model.
All of our symmetry groups are computed automatically using a tool: Symm-
Extractor, which makes use of the computational group theory package GAP
[23]. Although this approach could handle featured networks, the symmetry
detection process could be ineÆcient due to asymmetry induced by features,
which is not captured by the SCD. In Section 7 we dene a new kind of
diagram, the feature conguration diagram, which allows us to directly obtain
structural symmetries of a featured model.
6 The Template-based Approach
In this section we describe how we use a template-based approach to generate
a Promela specication of a featured system, which is open symmetric and
thus amenable to both abstraction (when the specication is parameterised
and safely featured) and symmetry reduction.
6.1 Overview of Approach
The basic idea is described in Figure 2. We have developed a tool Featured
Specication Generator (FSG) (a Java application) to generate an open sym-
metric specication from three meta les: the proctype denitions le, the
global denitions le and the feature conguration le, together with a series
of proctype templates, one for each proctype specied in the process denitions
le.
The proctype denitions le records, for each proctype in the model, the
name and number of instantiations of the proctype, and the type of the input
channel for instantiations of the proctype. The global denitions le includes
user-dened record types, as well as global variables (which must not be chan-
nels). The feature conguration le provides the name and conguration of
each (unary or binary) feature for the model. For each proctype declared in
the proctype denitions le there must be exactly one proctype template.
The template for a given proctype essentially consists of the body of the
proctype, but the Promela code is restricted to ensure that the generated
model is open symmetric. The template body can include template options|
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Fig. 2. The template-based approach
parameterised statements which are expanded during model generation to
allow non-deterministic choice over all component ids for a given proctype.
We describe the format of the proctype denitions le, the feature congura-
tion le and the process templates and show how FSG uses them to generate
an open symmetric Promela specication which is amenable to state-space re-
duction by both abstraction and symmetry. We illustrate the approach using
a featured email system adapted from [7]. Note that the global denitions le
requires no translation by FSG (and is empty for this example).
6.2 Proctype Denitions
The proctype denitions le consists of a series of denitions, each represent-
ing a single proctype. A denition has the form n : name ! [k] of flist of
typesg, where n  1 species how many copies of the proctype name should
be instantiated, k  0 is the length of the input channel for an instantiation of
this proctype, and list of types is a tuple of Promela types or user-dened types
which species the format which messages on this channel should conform to.
The following example gives the proctype denitions for an email system con-
sisting of ve client components, and a mailer component. The client input
channels are one place buers which accept messages of the form fsen; recg
where sen and rec are process ids. The mailer input channel is a ve place
buer, which accepts messages of the same form.
5 : client <- [1] of {pid,pid}
1 : mailer <- [5] of {pid,pid}
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From these denitions, FSG generates an initialised channel for each instan-
tiated process, a lookup procedure, headers for each proctype and the init
process. The lookup procedure returns the channel name associated with a
given id and the init process consists of a series of run statements instantiat-
ing the specied number of components for each proctype. Note that channel
linki is the channel associated with the ith instantiated process and, to en-
sure that the resulting specication is balanced, each proctype has a single
channel parameter, in.
FSG would generate the following from the proctype denitions le above:
chan link1 = [1] of {pid,pid}; chan link2 = [1] of {pid,pid}
;...; chan link6 = [5] of {pid,pid};
inline lookup(id,link) {
if
:: id==1 -> link = link1
:: id==2 -> link = link2
...
:: id==6 -> link = link6
fi
}
proctype client(chan in) {
/* Body generated from template */
}
proctype mailer(chan in) {
/* Body generated from template */
}
init {
atomic {
run client(link1); run client(link2);...; run client(link5);
run mailer(link6);
/* Feature configuration */
}
}
6.3 Feature Conguration
The feature conguration le species the name, arity and components as-
sociated with each feature for the model. A unary feature denition has the
form name[list of component ids], indicating that the feature name is switched
on for each of the components listed. The form of a binary feature is similar,
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except that a list of pairs of ids is specied.
Continuing the email example, the following conguration species a unary
feature AUTORESP (autorespond), which is on for client components 1 and 2,
and a binary feature FILTER, such that messages from client 5 intended for
client components 3 or 4 should be ltered.
AUTORESP[1,2]
FILTER[(3,5),(4,5)]
FSG generates feature initiation within the init process and an array of size
n+1 for each unary feature, and a 2-dimensional array of size (n+1) (n+1)
for each binary feature, where n is the number of components in the system.
Thus:
typedef array {
bit to[7]
};
hidden bit AUTORESP[7];
hidden array FILTER[7];
...
init {
atomic {
...
AUTORESP[1] = 1; AUTORESP[2] = 1;
FILTER[3].to[5] = 1; FILTER[4].to[5] = 1
}
}
Note that indices of the arrays go up to n + 1 because process identiers are
assigned from 1 upwards, but arrays in Promela are always indexed from 0.
As 2-dimensional arrays are not supported directly by Promela they must be
specied using a new array type, as shown above.
6.4 Proctype Templates
For each proctype specied in the proctype denitions le there must be ex-
actly one template le, named corresponding to the proctype. Recall that
each proctype has a single parameter, in, which is the input channel for an in-
stantiation of the proctype. The template for a proctype consists of Promela
statements which must obey certain restrictions, and can include template
options.
To ensure a xed number of components and channels, new components may
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not be instantiated dynamically using a run statement, and channel variables
may be declared, but not initialised as new channels (they may be assigned to
names of existing channels). To ensure that the generated specication is open
symmetric and balanced, literal component id values and the global channel
names link1, link2, : : : linkn may not be referred to explicitly: literal id
values may be used via a template option (see below), and global channel
names may be accessed using the lookup inline. Finally, component identiers
may not be assigned to or from variables of other types, used as operands to
arithmetic operators, or to the boolean operators <, , > and .
We now dene the syntax for template options. A template option may be
used as a guard for an if..fi or do..od statement, to allow nondeterministic
choice over all components of a specic proctype. The syntax for a template
option is: for name in proctype name f Promela statement g, where name
is a legal Promela variable name which is not already used in the scope of
the statement, proctype name is the name of some proctype in the model,
and Promela statement is a (simple or compound) Promela statement which
may refer to name as if it were a literal value of type pid, and may itself
contain template options. FSG expands choice options to include a concrete
option for every associated component identier. In the email example, a client
component may choose to send a message, via the mailer, to any component
of type client. In the client template, such a message is initialised using the
following template option:
if
:: for i in client { msg.receiver = i }
fi
which FSG expands to the following non-deterministic choice:
if
:: msg.receiver = 1
:: msg.receiver = 2
:: msg.receiver = 3
:: msg.receiver = 4
:: msg.receiver = 5
fi
All of the code for the email example can be found as an appendix to this
paper on our website [6]. This includes all of the denitions les, the proctype
template les and the full Promela specication generated by FSG.
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6.5 Applying Abstraction/Induction or Symmetry Reduction to Generated
Specications
By construction, the specications generated by FSG are open symmetric. In
order to apply our abstraction/induction approach of Section 4.1 to a param-
eterised specication, it is necessary to check that it is safely featured. We can
do this easily using FSG. The email example above is safely featured, as is the
telephone example discussed in Section 3.
In order to apply symmetry detection techniques (for symmetry reduction) no
additional check is necessary. (Indeed specications do not even need to be
parameterised (see Section 2.3.2)). In Section 7 we show that we can generate
a graphical representation of the communication structure of the system from
the les used to generate the specication, from which to derive symmetry of
the underlying model.
7 Symmetry Detection for Featured Networks
In this section, we show that if a Promela specication has been generated
using the template-based approach then a symmetry group of the model un-
derlying the specication can be derived from a directed graph called the
feature conguration diagram for the specication. The feature conguration
diagram itself can be obtained eÆciently from the feature conguration and
proctype denitions les used to generate the specication.
7.1 Feature Conguration Diagrams
Recall from Section 2.2 that a binary feature B naturally induces a rela-
tion R(B) on the set of component identiers of a featured specication. The
feature conguration diagram for a Promela specication is a directed graph
whose vertices are the component identiers, coloured according to their pro-
cess type and the unary features to which they subscribe, and whose edges
are the elements of R(B) for each binary feature with which the specication
is congured. These edges are also coloured, according to the exact sets R(B)
to which they belong.
Formally, let F = UUB be a set of features, where U = fU
1
; U
2
; : : : ; U
x
g are
unary, and B = fB
1
; B
2
; : : : ; B
y
g are binary (for some x; y  0).
Let T be a nite set of component types and, for a set of n components, let
type : f1; 2; : : : ; ng ! T be a mapping which associates each component with
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a type.
Denition 10 Let P be a Promela specication congured with features F =
U [ B. The feature conguration diagram FCD(P) is a directed graph with
coloured vertices and coloured edges: FCD(P) = (V;E; C
V
; C
E
) where:
 V = f1; 2; : : : ; ng
 E =
S
y
i=1
R(B
i
)
 C
V
: V ! f0; 1g
x
 T is dened by C
V
(i) = (U
1
[i]; U
2
[i]; : : : ; U
x
[i]; type(i))
 C
E
: E ! f0; 1g
y
is dened by
C
E
((i; j)) = (
R(B
1
)
((i; j)); 
R(B
2
)
((i; j)); : : : ; 
R(B
y
)
((i; j)))
Consider a conguration of the email model with 5 client components, featured
as follows:
AUTORESP[1]
FILTER[(2,1)]
Let P be the Promela specication of the email system with ve client com-
ponents, and features as above. Then FCD(P) = (V;E; C
V
; C
E
) where V =
f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g; E = f(2; 1)g; C
V
(1) = (1; client) (indicating that client com-
ponent 1 has the autorespond feature), C
V
(i) = (0; client) for 2  i  5 (client
components 2 to 5 have no unary features), C
V
(6) = (0;mailer) (the mailer
component is unfeatured); and C
E
((2; 1)) = 1 (component 2 subscribes to the
lter feature with respect to client 1).
7.2 Automorphisms of Feature Conguration Diagrams
For a Promela specication P which has been generated using the template-
based approach of Section 6, we dene an automorphism of the feature con-
guration diagram for P thus:
Denition 11 An automorphism of FCD(P) is a bijection  of f1; 2; : : : ; ng
such that
 (i; j) 2 E , ((i); (j)) 2 E
 C
V
(i) = C
V
((i)) 8 i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng
 C
E
((i; j)) = C
E
(((i); (j))) 8 i; j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng:
Consider the FCD for the email example, described in Section 7.1. It is easy
to check that the permutation (3 4) is an automorphism of this FCD, whereas
(1 2) is not as components 1 and 2 are coloured dierently. In fact if P is
a Promela specication of the email system with this feature conguration
diagram then Aut(FCD(P)) = h(3 4); (4 5)i.
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7.3 Action of Aut(FCD(P)) on M
Let P be a Promela program. In order to show how an element ofAut(FCD(P))
acts on states of the Kripke structure associated with P, we must dene the
set AP of atomic propositions for a Promela program. Let Loc be the set of
local variables, Glob the set of global variables, and Chan the set of channels
of P. Let D be the set of data values for the program. To denote a local
variable of a process with process id i we write x
i
where x is the name of the
variable. If x
i
is a local variable of process i, and if processes i and j have the
same process type, then x
j
is the corresponding local variable of process j.
Let AP
local
= f(x
i
= val) : x
i
2 Loc; val 2 Dg, the set of propositions relating
to local variables, and dene AP
global
and AP
channel
, the set of propositions
relating to global variables and channels respectively, similarly. Then AP =
AP
local
[AP
global
[AP
channel
. The underlying Kripke structureM over AP for
the program P is generated by exploring all possible behaviours of P. States
of M are uniquely identied by a labelling of atomic propositions. Note that
each process in P has its own program counter variable which indicates the
statements which may be executed in the next transition. Thus two states, for
which all other variables are assigned identical values, may be distinguished
due to assignments of the associated program counters.
For an element  2 Aut(FCD(P)) we dene a corresponding mapping 

which is a permutation of the Kripke structure M underlying P. If val 2 D
has type chan, i.e. val = link
i
for some 1  i  n, then (val) = link
(i)
. For
any s 2 S, let L(

(s)) = f(p) : p 2 L(s)g. For a proposition p 2 AP , the
proposition (p) is dened as follows:
If p = (x
i
== val) 2 AP
local
for some x
i
2 Loc, where the type of x
i
is pid
or chan, then (p) = (x
(i)
== (val)), otherwise (p) = (x
(i)
== val). If
p = (x == val) 2 AP
global
for some x 2 Glob, where the type of x is pid or
chan, then (p) = (x == (val)), otherwise (p) = p. If p = (link
i
[j] ==
msg) 2 AP
channel
, i.e. msg is at position j on channel link
i
, then (p) =
(link

i
[j] == (msg)). Here  acts on msg by permuting the value of each
eld ofmsg which has type pid or chan, and leaving all other elds unchanged.
7.4 Correspondence Between Aut(FCD(P)) and Aut(M)
The following theorem shows that if P is a Promela specication of a featured
network, generated by our template-based approach, we can derive a symme-
try group for the Kripke structure M underlying P from a symmetry group
for the feature conguration diagram, FCD(P). We sketch the proof, which
is analogous to a similar result for automatic symmetry detection by static
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channel diagram analysis [17].
Theorem 3 Let  2 Aut(FCD(P)). Then 

2 Aut(M).
Proof 1 Without loss of generality, assume that all statements of P have the
form
guard! update
Let (s; t) 2 R, and suppose this transition is red by statement g ! u in P.
Let (g) be the guard obtained from g by replacing each occurrence of a literal
pid value i or channel reference link link
i
, with the value (i) or link
(i)
respectively. Dene the update (u) similarly. Clearly, applying the update
(u) to the state 

(s) leads to the state 

(t). Similarly (g) is executable in
state 

(s), since it is executable in state s and  belongs to Aut(FCD(P))
and so preserves the truth of boolean expressions over feature arrays. The
statement (g) ! (u) is in P due to the open symmetry of P, which is
guaranteed by the template-based approach.
Thus the statement (g)! (u) is enabled in state 

(s), and res the transi-
tion (

(s); 

(t)). It follows that (

(s); 

(t)) 2 R, and hence 

2 Aut(M).
8 Implementation
For symmetry reduction, FSG uses the saucy program [16] and the GAP system
[23] to compute Aut(FCD(P)). We could not nd a graph automorphism
computation package to work directly with graphs that have coloured edges,
so in practice Aut(FCD(P)) is computed (using GAP) as the intersection over
the set of binary features of groups Aut(R(B); C
V
). Here Aut(R(B); C
V
) is
the group which preserves the relation R(B) as well as the vertex colouring
C
V
.
We have also developed a prototype symmetry reduction package for the SPIN
model checker. The package is based on an existing symmetry reduction pack-
age, SymmSpin [3], but whereas SymmSpin requires symmetries to be specied
using scalarsets (a purpose-built data type for symmetry reduction), our sys-
tem supports automatic symmetry detection by static channel diagram analy-
sis [19], or, in this case, by feature conguration diagram analysis as described
above. During search, orbit representatives are computed in a standard way
by sorting the vector associated with a state. This representative computation
technique has been used in a variety of approaches to symmetry reduction
[3,11,21].
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9 Experimental Results for Symmetry Reduction
In this section we demonstrate the eectiveness of symmetry reduction using
FSD for the email example. We consider email specications with a varying
number of client components. For each specication size, we consider the case
where components are unfeatured, and the case where components 1 and 2
are featured as in Section 7.1. In Table 1 we show, for each specication size,
Unfeatured
#clients #states time jGj #states time
(orig.) (orig.) (red.) (red.)
3 23,256 0.1 6 3,908 0.2
4 852,641 9 24 38,560 2
5 3:04  10
7 y
3576 120 315,323 40
6 1:5  10
9
(E) - 720 2:3 10
6
576
7 6:9 10
10
(E) - 5040 1:53  10
7
6573
Featured
3 46,151 0.2 1 n/a n/a
4 2:3 10
6
33 2 1:2 10
6
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5 9:5  10
7
(E) - 6 1:75  10
7
1160
Table 1
Experimental results.
the sizes of the state spaces associated with both unfeatured and featured
networks, together with the sizes of the corresponding reduced state spaces
when symmetry reduction is applied. We give the time taken for verication
in seconds. In each case, the size of the symmetry group computed by FSG is
given. For congurations for which verication proved intractable an estimate
(denoted \(E)") is given for the number of number of states and the time
omitted (indicated by \-"). Entries marked \n/a" indicate that symmetry
reduction is not applicable, due to a trivial symmetry group.
By default, no compression was used during search. For large models, the
collapse compression technique provided by SPIN [25] was used (indicated by
y), which results in slower verication. All experiments were performed on
a PC with a 2.4GHz Intel Xeon processor, 3Gb of available main memory,
running Red Hat Linux, with SPIN version 4.2.3.
Notice that in the unfeatured case with three client processes, adding symme-
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try reduction results in fewer states but longer verication time. Exploiting
symmetry carries a time overhead due to the conversion of states to their rep-
resentatives. When the unreduced state-space is small, the overhead can result
in an increase in search time when symmetry reduction is applied.
If jM j and jM
G
j are the number of states of the unreduced and reduced models
respectively, then if jGj is the size of the associated symmetry group, jM j 
jM
G
j:jGj (as each state of M
G
represents at most jGj states of M). In all of
the experiments where it was possible to nd jM j (and where there was a
non-trivial symmetry group), it was found to be between eighty and ninety
six percent of this upper bound. Therefore, in cases where it is impossible to
generate M , an estimate is given at approximately the middle of this range
(ninety percent of the upper bound).
As expected, adding features to a specication considerably reduces the size
of the symmetry group associated with the underlying model. Additionally,
the autorespond feature increased the size of the state space in all cases quite
dramatically. Nevertheless, applying symmetry reduction to featured speci-
cations where there are several identically featured (in this case, unfeatured)
components leads to large savings in both memory requirements and verica-
tion time. For large examples it proved possible to generate the reduced state
space when the original state space was intractably large.
If two features do not interact, for example message ltering is not aected
by the autorespond feature [7], then an exhaustive search of the state space
associated with a specication is required. These experimental results show
that state space reduction by symmetry can be extremely useful in such cases.
10 Scalability of our Approach
Our abstraction/induction approach is not limited to systems with one or
two component types. We can extend the approach to any system in which
there are a small number of components types (but potentially large numbers
of components of each type). For example we believe our approach is to be
eminently applicable to the verication of SIP networks [33], which consist of
end user devices and dierent type of server components, and to Web Services
[46]. The investigation of the applicability of our approach in these cases (e.g.
the determination as to when such systems are balanced), is the subject of
future work.
Symmetry reduction techniques, by their nature, allow one to apply model
checking techniques to some systems which, in unreduced form, are not ver-
iable. However, even in systems which clearly contain inherent symmetry,
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the application of reduction methods is usually ad hoc and time consuming.
Our template-based approach allows us to simply and automatically apply
symmetry reduction to models of systems as they are developed.
As new featured domains emerge, our techniques will allow us to rapidly and
systematically produce Promela models to which both abstraction/induction
and symmetry reduction can be applied for eÆcient feature interaction analysis
using model checking.
11 Related Work
Model checking for feature interaction analysis has been investigated by others,
notable approaches are those using COSPAN [22], Caesar [45], SMV [40], SPIN
(the FeaVer project) [26,27,44] and a bespoke tool [30]. None of these studies
generalise results to more than three or four users.
As we have discussed in Section 2.3.2, the invariant approach to parameterised
model checking problem has been applied in many contexts [4,13,34]. However,
none of these address the feature interaction problem.
Symmetry reduction in model checking is a common technique. However, in
most cases symmetries of a model are either known a priori [12], or are coded
into the model through the use of special keywords [3,29]. Both approaches
require the modeller to provide information on the presence of symmetry in a
model. Our automatic symmetry detection method allows us to infer symme-
tries of the state-space underlying a model without explicitly constructing the
state-space.
Symmetry reduced model checking for feature interaction detection is con-
sidered in [39], where permutation symmetry is used to construct a reduced
symmetric reachability graph, which is similar to a quotient Kripke structure.
Their approach is only applicable to cases where all of the users subscribe to
all of the features currently being analysed, and as a result their unreduced
models grow even faster than ours and the automorphism group is the group
of all permutations of the user ids. For this reason, no symmetry detection is
required. We believe that our approach is more realistic and adaptable.
As far as we are aware, we are the rst to develop a systematic technique
for the construction of specications which are amenable to both inductive
analysis and symmetry reduction methods.
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12 Conclusions
Model checking is a popular automated technique for reasoning about net-
works of components; it is often applied to the problem of detecting inter-
actions between featured components. But, it suers from the well known
problem of state space explosion.
Abstraction is key to reducing the state space. Two common abstraction ap-
proaches are induction by invariant (to encapsulate the behaviour of a system
of any size) and symmetry reduction (to encapsulate the behaviour of a group
of permutations by a representative). While these two approaches are generally
considered to be orthogonal, we have found that they are related. In particular,
they are both applicable under similar circumstances. We encapsulate these
circumstances by a property of the system specication: open symmetry.
Essentially, this property constrains the way components refer to other com-
ponents in the system. The constraints are reasonably intuitive and not overly
restrictive.
Our main result is a template for producing components that are open sym-
metric, and a new graphical representation for the entire system, called the
feature conguration diagram. Any (safely featured parameterised) specica-
tion thus produced is immediately amenable to state reduction by induction
(using the invariant method), and any generated specication is applicable for
symmetry reduction (using an automorphism group derived from the feature
conguration diagram). We believe that this represents a novel application
of symmetry detection (and thus reduction) for featured networks. The tem-
plate is dened for the specication language Promela, but the approach is
applicable to other specication formalisms. Throughout, the techniques are
illustrated by application to an example featured network: email.
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